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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(h)(Michie 1996), the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to hear "...appealsfromDistrict Court involving domestic relations cases, property
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity."

STATEMENT OF TJ8E ISSVES ANP STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE I: Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting alimony without
predicating that award with specificfindingsas to the three pronged Jonesl test required by the
Supreme Court of Utah?
Standard of Review : The trial court's applications of law and legal conclusions regarding
alimony are reviewed for correctness. Bell v Bell 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct App 1991).
IgSUE n : Did the trial court commit clear error in making afindingof fact that the
Appellee had an income of zero for alimony computation?
Standard of Review: The trial court's factualfindingsare reviewed for clear error, Elmer
v Elmer. 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), see also Rothe v Rothe. 787 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
ISSUE III: Did the trial court commit clear error in making afindingof fact as to the
amount of Appellant's net income for alimony computation?
Standard of Review : The trial court's factualfindingsare reviewed for clear error, Elmer
v Elmer. 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989) see also RothevRothe. 787 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

1

Jones v Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
^Mature of Proceedings :This action below was a divorce proceeding filed by the Appellee /
Plaintiff hereinafter "Appellee"

The stated grounds for the divorce were irreconcilable

differences with the Appellant/Defendant, hereinafter Appellant. The Appellee moved for child
support, alimony, custody of the minor children.
Course of the Proceedings : The Appellee was granted various temporary orders as to
custody, alimony, child support and visitation at an order to show cause hearing held on July 26,
1996. R. 22,25. After once being postponed, the matter was set for trial on April 28,1997.
Counsel for the defendant moved for a continuance prior to trial by motion, and once again
renewed this motion at trial which was denied. At this point Appellant dismissed his counsel of
record and moved for a continuance to retain other counsel, again this motion was denied.
Trial proceeded and Appellee presented two witnesses Antonella Turnow, Appellee, and
Toni Hughes a child therapist. Appellant presented two witnesses; Leo Turnow, Appellant and
James Tornow, son to a previous marriage of Appellant. The direct testimony of the witnesses
for the Appellee was largely composed of evidence that could not have withstood proper
objections on evidentiary grounds. However, the Appellant proceeding pro se was unadvised and
had insuflBcient legal knowledge to properly object in each and every notice of improperly entered
evidence. Appellant did, however, make statements re: the issues raised in this appeal that would
signify bringing a pro se parties objection to the trial court's attention.
Disposition of the Trial Court :The trial court ruledfromthe bench at the close of
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evidence awarding custody to Appellee with an order for Toni Hughes to draft a visitation plan.
The trial court ordered alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars a month and child support
in the amount of one thousand four hundred and seven dollars a month be paid by Appellant. The
trial court made various other orders not issue here.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellee testified during direct that she had been supplementing her income by
substituting as a teacher R. 340,342. Counsel for Appellee admitted to purposefully
withholding information concerning the true value of Appellee's income. R. 460. Counsel for
Appellee admitted as PlaintifiTs Exhibit 3 financial worksheets that declared this monthly income
of Appellee to be zero. R. 460,132 Pl.f's] Ex. 3. Counsel for Appellee admitted as PlaintifiTs
Exhibit 4 a child support obligation worksheet that again states Appellee's income at zero. R.
460,132Pl.['s]Ex.4.
Appellant testified as to his gross income being $4,833. R. 516. Appellant twice raised
the issue of the effect of being in a higher tax bracket, R. 516, 558.
With respect to Appellee's request for alimony and her present and future ability to earn,
the trial court found (1) that Appellee currently worked part-time. R. 559; (2) that Appellee had
a high school diploma and some college education short of a degree. R. 558; (3) that Appellee
wants to be a teacher. R. 559; (4) that the training to become a teacher would take five years. R.
559. The court then ordered alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars for five years. R.
565.
With respect to Appellant's income and ability to provide requested alimony the trial court
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found (1) Appellant's gross monthly income to be $ 4,833. R. 559; (2) that Appellant's net
income be set at $ 3,624 based upon the trial court's own appraisal of roughly what amount of
taxes would be withheld. R. 565.

ISSUE NUMBER I; SUMMARY
Appellant is entitled to have award of alimony set aside as a matter of law. The Utah
Supreme Court has set out three specific factors that must be considered when the trial court is
set upon fashioning an award of alimony.2 In the instant case the trial court (1) failed to make any
manner offindingsas to thefinancialneeds of the Appellee; (2) made afindingwholly opposed to
the evidence at trial as to the current ability of Appellee to earn; (3) lacking the proper evidence
as to deductions from Appellant's gross pay, the court arbitrarily devalued Appellant's monthly
income to the netfigureused infiguringhis ability to provide requested alimony.3 The trial
court's negligent handling of the facts and unsubstantiatedfindingsof facts invalidate the award of
alimony. Based upon the foregoing the Appellant is entitled to relief against the unsubstantiated
grant of alimony.

2

Jones v Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985.

3

This type of random manipulation of the numbers without some foundation by way of
evidence is exactly the type conduct this Court warned against in Willeyv. WilleyT 914 P.2d 1149
(UtahCtApp. 1996).
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ISSUE NUMBER I; ARGUMENT
In general an award of alimony is used to "equalize the parties respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that...enjoyed during the marriage,"
Gardner v Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, at 1081 (Utah 1988). The grant of alimony to a spouse is
also used to "prevent the spousefrombecoming a public charge." English v. English. 565 P.2d
409, at 411 (Utah 1977). When one of the parties is seeking an award of alimony the trial court
must weigh a variety of factors in deciding if it is warranted in that particular case.
The Supreme Court of Utah has set out the following three factors that must be
considered when the trial court is called upon to determine if alimony should be awarded :
"three factors.. .must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award. [1] thefinancialconditions and needs of the [spouse seeking
support];[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking support] to produce
a sufficient income for [himself or] herself, and [3] the ability of the
[payor spouse] to provide support," Jones at 1075.
In Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App.1991), this Court reviewed a case very similar to
the instant case where an award of alimony was chaUenged on the grounds that the trial court had
not made suflBcientfindingsas to the lones factors. This Court entered a holding that "[fjailure to
consider the Jones factors in fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Bell
at 492. Additionally, in Bfill the factualfindingsof the trial court were challenged as insufficient
to support the award of alimony. In evaluating the specificity of the factualfindingsof the trial
court this Court stated that:
"the trial court must make sufficiently detailedfindingson each
factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the Trial Court's
discretionary determination was rationally based upon the three
Jones factors." Efifl at 492.
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This standard has been repeatedly upheld where the trial court has been delinquent either
in making the necessaryfindings,or when thefindingsthemselves are lacking in specificity.4
The prevailing law cited above must now be applied to the facts of the instant case and the
disputedfindingsof fact issued by the trial court and how they relate to the lones4 factors.
It is difficult to bifurcate thefindingsmade by the trial court as to thefirstand second
prong of the Jones test as the trial court did not set out specifically set out afindingas to either
prong. Thefindingsthemselves manifest in what appears to be a casual synopsis of what was
purported at trial by way of testimony. Thefindingscontain very little if any analysis as to weight
given to testimony, or how testimony was utilized in evaluating the respective claims of the
parties. Exacerbating the already difficult analysis is the degree to which certain evidence may be
generally relevant as to both current need of spouse and future ability of spouse to earn. Because
of the above described difficulties Appellant will discuss analysis of prong one and two together.
The trial court made thefindingthat "for the purposes of child support and alimony, that
the plaintiff works part-time as a substitute teacher." R. 558. The trial court further found that
"there was no testimony as to plaintiffs part-time income, that she's been primarily in the home
raising children." R. 559. Additional trial courtfindingsare that Appellee has "education,
graduated the...equivalent of high school... some college, but no formal degree." R. 558. The
trial court found that Appellee had a "desire to be a teacher." R. 559. The trial court made a
findings that it would take ".. .five years to complete the training..." R. 559. The foregoing

4

See generally MUMIS V. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah a . App. 1990); Noble v Noble.
761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988); Willevv Willev. 866 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Bell v Bell.
810 P.2d 489(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Stevens v Stevens. 754 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Eafei
xJEafel 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); Davis vDavjs. 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988); Asperv Asperr
753 P.2d 978 (Utah a . App. 1988).
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represents a marshaling of all thefindingspertaining to both [1] need of the spouse requesting
alimony and [2] ability of spouse requesting alimony to provide sufficient independent income.
The trial court has made passing notice of the evidence presented at trial, but makes
absolutely no attempt to cohesively apply the facts at hand to the standard imposed by Jones.
Although the trial court made afindingas to Appellee being employed part-time the trial court
ignored its ownfindingand valued her income at zero for the purposes of computing alimony and
child support. Absolutely no evidence of any kind was elicited at trial that she received no income
from her part-time work. In fact the only evidence was that she was indeed receiving monies.5
The trial court appears to have erroneously relied upon the reassurances of Mr. Peterson, counsel
for Appellee, when Mr. Peterson informed the Court that he had purposefully decided not to
include the information regarding her income based on his experience that it would be of no
consequence. R. 460.
Despite contentions of Appellee's counsel about having an accurate assessment of the
income of the spouse seeking an award of alimony, this Court has stated that:
**the court must make realistic assessments of actual current income
and actual expenses...[a]bsent such an assessment and appropriate
findings, there is no basis on which to determine the proper amount
and duration of alimony to achieve a rehabilitative outcome."
Xfiltey866P.2dat554.
The third prong of the IQQSS factors relates to the ability of the spouse not seeking support
to provide for an award of alimony. The trial court made afindingsthat the Appellant's gross
salary was $4,833.00. R. 559. Infiguringthe net amount of $ 3,624.00, the trial court took an

5

n.

A complete presentation of the evidence in this matter is marshaled in the body of Issue
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arbitrary "25 percent of that for FICA and taxes. Fm going to leave the other expenses, but just
FICA and taxes represent roughly about 25 percent" R. 565. This rounding down of the gross
pay is done completely sua sponte and absolutely no evidence of any kind was presented as to
what amounts are being currently deductedfromthe Appellant's gross pay. The trial court then
finds that based upon this arbitrary number that "would leave about an $ 800.00 difference of
[Appellant's] net income and necessary expenses." R. 565. These represent all of the findings
and orders made in regards to the third prong of the Jones factors. Once again the Trial Court
has completely failed to craft a discerniblefindingof fact in regards to the ability of the spouse not
seeking alimony to provide sought after support. The instant facts surrounding the trial court's
lack of consideration of the lanes factors are similar to the deficiencies. The supreme court noted
when arriving at the holding in Jones where it stated:
'"Nowhere in the trial court's memorandum decision, itfindingsof
fact, or its statements made on the record at the conclusion of the
hearing is there any indication that the court analyzed the
circumstances of the parties in light of these three factors."

Cowctosion and Statement for Relief
The facts in this case clearly warrant that this case be remanded to the trial court to make
findings in accordance with well established Utah law. The trial court has failed to even cursorily
address the requirements of Jones and in so doing has undermined the question of the
reasonableness of the award of alimony. Accordingly the Appellant would pray for the following
relief:
1. That the order by the trial court directing that the Appellant be ordered to pay alimony
be vacated.
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2. That a hearing be held in which either party may present evidence as t o the underlying

Appellee t o provide for herself, the amount o f Appellee's part-time work, c u m i I rli di :l
from the Appellant's paychecks and any other evidence the trial cc in: t • it m is i e I z • ant.
i That the trial court be instructed to fashion specific findings as to the tin ee factoi s
required in Jones, and to craft those findings upon admissible evidence presented at the hearing to
be held pursuant t \ > 11 Htn I i i ni ni il s dn 11 il ni
I That if the n e w findings indicate an appreciable difference between what is currently
ordered for child support and would be ordered if the n e w numbers were used th en the ti lal ;:> z \ II I:
be given the discretion t o amend the previous order as t o future child support pa> ments i egai ding
the amounts.

ISSUE NUMBER U; SUMMARY
The trial court committed clear error when

Ii

an income o f zero for the purposes o f computing alimony

I UMI iliiiiliiiji, iLii ilir A^icllci I i I
I II! i vicJencT elicited at trial, mostly

on direct by the Appellee herself, can clearly support only a finding that Appellee indeed w a s
receiving . -

monthly income The trial court disregarded all available evidence and

instead reached a holding wholly at odds with the record in this case. Accordingly, the Appellant

make findings consistent with current actual income o f the Appellee
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ISSUE NTOBER H; ARGUMENT
The trial court is granted considerable discretion to makefindingsof fact based upon
evidence at trial. In reviewingfindingsmade during trial, the Supreme Court has stated that it will
"favor thefindings,judgements and decrees of the trial court, particularly in divorce matters."
Watson v Watson. 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977) at 1073. Utah statute and this Court promote the
fact that the trial court is in the best position to assess weight to evidence and has the chance to
makefirsthand impressions of the witnesses and testimony, see generally Utah R. Civ. P
52(a)(Supp. 1996), and Marchaffl V, Marchant, 743 P,2d 199, at 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) .
Notwithstanding this, therightof review on appeal has its purposes. Utah Constitution Article
VIII Section 5 guarantees "an appeal ofright..to a court with appellate jurisdiction." To this
end the Supreme Court has stated that it would be "remiss in its responsibility ...if it
unquestioningly accepted all actions of the trial court." Watson at 1073. The court of appeals has
held that ic[a]findingis clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence or if we
are otherwise definitely andfirmlyconvinced that a mistake has been made." Hardy vr Hardy, 776
P.2d 917, at 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
With this standard in view Appellant will now marshal the evidence that was presented at
trial in regards to the income of the Appellee.
The Appellee testified during her direct testimony that "I've been substituting on the—on
the Davis School District." R. 340. When Appellee was asked on direct if " y ° u r e &le to
supplement [your child support and alimony payments] to some degree with your part-time
work?" R. 342. The Appellee stated "Yes." R. 343.
Counsel for the Appellee entered into evidence two separate documents concerning the
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financial situation of the Appellee. Appellee valued her monthly income at zero in her financial

support worksheets once again her monthly income was valued at zero R 132 P l . f s ] Ex. 4.
Although the next excerpt from the trial does not wholly qualify as di it • t • :: t s i :I i ' nice, it w as
a comment by counsel in response to a question by the trial court, A

€11IV U 1 V 1 U U W O 1 1 t * 0 AUX H A W *

indicia that indeed the Appellee was receiving income. Upon the trial court's question regarding

not include it, your honor lie 2 : a as 3 .it is minimal and my experien :: sha st 1 t nthat h wi] • : ; 1 11
talking about these low numbers, if you get the higher income with a 1c < 1 spousal income. that th c •
ratio ends up about the same, so I—we—we felt it was of no consequence. "!l .1 460. Despite the
brevity of the foregoing section it represents a comprehensive review of the evidefi c 1 • lit 2 a • :i it trial
r-*""'s«

-

*"•

*

Appellee

Based upon this te

ie afindingsthat 'Tor the purposes of child

the trial court found that **there was no testimony as to plaintiffs part-time income, that she's
been primarily in the home raising children,.' " ' R 559. By lookii
child support. The trial court subsequently used

"; •

••

!

• • 1;< lony and
1 111: ing child

support and alimony.
In light c: f th 2 complete lack of evidence in H>MII1'I ill Ihcsefindings,the duty of this Court
to set aside these unsubstantiatedfindingsis clear. Accordingly the Appellant would ask for the
folio ingi elii: rf:

Statement for Rgiifef
1. That the trial court'sfindingof zero value for the Appellee's monthly income be
vacated.
2. That the trial court be instructed to hold a hearing at which time both parties be allowed
to present evidence as to the income of the Appellee.
3. That the trial court be instructed to makefindingsconsistent with a realistic assessment
of the actual and real income of the Appellee.
4. That the trial court utilize the corrected figures for income when computing the various
orders necessary for post-decree support.

ISSUE NUMgER m; SUMMARY
The trial court committed clear error when it madefindingsas to Appellant's net income
for the purposes of computing alimony and child support. The only evidence presented at trial
was to the Appellant's gross income. The trial court then arbitrarily devalued the gross amount to
arrive at a net figure for computational purposes. This manner of random, foundationless and
unsolicited manipulation of the numbers is at odds with foundation of the judiciary system.
Accordingly, the Appellant is entitled to have thefindingsas to Appellant's net income vacated
and remanded for the trial court to makefindingsconsistent with this Court's holdings.
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ISSUE NVMPER m ; ARGUMENT

court'sfindingsof fact. In an effort to limit unnecessary

.vu, Appellant will defer to and

incorporate thefirstparagraph of the argument portion of Issue II, located at page 10 of this brief,

There is very little direct evidence to marshal i
trial court to arri\ e at the n etfiguie.' I h t App

s made by the

himseii ^

i™ *

:>eing

$ 4,833.00. *v. - ^ . The limited testimony regarding deductionsfromthat gross amount again
camefromthe Appellant where he expressed concerns that: "I am. now a single pe i: son, I'm going
to

be in the highest tax bracket. There is also a loanfromthe retirement account" R. 516. Further

518.

and taxes. I'm going to leave the other expenses, but just FICA and taxes represent i oughl) about
25 percent" 1 565 This rounding down of the gross pay is done completely sua sponte and
absolutely no evidence of any kind was presented as to what amounts are being currently
deductedfromthe Appellant's gross pay. The lack of detail by the trial court in preserving its

Marchflpt. this Court stated thatfindingsoffeetmust be "sufficiently detailed and include enough

reached." Maichant at 202 citing to Acton V Peliim 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). The I i Ial COM t

Page

J "
.! ," J

I\<

making this sort of unsubstantiated adjustments to the numbers when computing income for the
worksheets has been chagrined by this Court previously. In Willey v Willey. 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996), the trial court sua sponte reduced the stipulated expenses of the parties without
any evidence by either of the parties. When making the reductions the trial court neglected to
affirmatively state for the record upon what basis the reductions were made In evaluating the
appropriateness of those reductions this Court stated that:
"ft]he sheer absence of any evidence upon which to base the factual
findings regarding these adjustments makes them unacceptable. To
allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory
process violates the basic premise upon which our judicial system is
founded." Willey 914 P.2d at 1152.
The facts concerning the reductions made in Willey^ and the court's method of arriving at
a net figure in this case are similarly random in nature. In both Wiltey and the instant case, the
disputed adjustments were unsubstantiated either by the record, or clearly supported by findings
sufficient to enable this Court to properly exercise appellate review. Thefindingsin this case are
so vague that no insight can as to the trial court's reasoning can be deduced. Accordingly
Appellant moves for the following relief.

Statement of Retief
1.

That the trial court'sfindingsas to the net income of the Appellant be vacated.

2.

That a hearing be held and at that time both parties be able to submit evidence and
information regarding the proper deduction to madefromthe gross pay of the
Appellant.

3.

That the trial court be instructed to make newfindingsof facts in regards to the
amount of net pay for the Appellant.

4.

That any awards of spousal support be computed utilizing the corrected figures.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of November, 1997.

7

rances M. Palacios
Attorney for Appellant
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This is to certify that on the 17* day of November, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed first
class postage pre-paid to the following: Sennet P. Peterson,
Attorney for Appellee, 74 East 500 South, Suite 205, Bountiful,
Utah 84010; the Honorable Jon M. Memmot, 800 West State
Street, Farmington, Utah 84025.
francesm Palacios
Attorney for Appellant
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